North Mumbai Elections of 1962: When Nawab Nehru Batted for a Communist Traitor

THE UGLY FRACAS that erupted in the last Parliamentary session over Dr. Ambedkar’s legacy literally gave a bloody nose to one MP and left another injured. It is also the latest outbreak of the Congress party’s deep-rooted and well-documented propensity for violence. Its origins can be traced to the first split in the “original” Indian National Congress in 1907 held at French Gardens, Surat. The so-called Moderates had hired armed Bohra Muslim goondas to ostensibly “teach a lesson to the leader from Maharashtra, Mr. Tilak.” What followed was a violent clash right on the dais between the Moderates and Extremists. 

But the top Congress leadership had also perfected the art of non-violent victim-taking each time things didn’t go its way. Dr. B.R. Ambedkar was one of the high-profile victims of this skulduggery. His caustic resignation speech in Parliament on 10 October 1951 gives us some dark hints of how Jawaharlal Nehru got rid of people who didn’t kowtow to him.   

As painful as it is to read this, it is also the first-person account of a well-known truth: of Ambedkar’s shabby treatment at the hands of both the Gandhian and Nehruvian Congress. 

It appears that the BJP, in this session of the Parliament, acted passionately than clinically, when it invoked Ambedkar’s name. 

On a broader plane, the biggest casualty once again, is the same. Over the past half a century, public discourse truthfully evaluating Ambedkar’s overall legacy has been derailed and mauled beyond recognition. This outcome owes to a singular factor: his blind deification, instead of objective appreciation. The closest allusion to this approach is found in a lovely phrase in the Sanskrit literary tradition: Sahrudaya Sameeksha — critical evaluation by a literary connoisseur.      

Thus, Ambedkar today occupies the same position that Gandhi once did in the Indian political pantheon. Anything spoken or written about Ambedkar in less than an epistolary tone invites instant wrath, condemnation, effigy-burning and a bloody nose. 

While there’s much to appreciate Ambedkar for, there is much to critique as well. Even a superifical persual of his body of work shows that had he been alive, he would have himself welcomed any critique of many of his formulations. If anything, he was open-minded.  

The BJP, in its attempt to combat the Congress-led cacophony of the opposition, hammered on the infamous 1952 election to North Bombay in which Jawaharlal Nehru personally ensured Ambedkar’s defeat, with the support of the violent Communist leader, S.A. Dange. 

The BJP merely stopped at this election instead of going even further. 

NORTH BOMBAY was the same battleground where a similar drama was enacted exactly ten years later with the same climax. 

Acharya Kriplani now occupied the place of Babasaheb Ambedkar. 

The obscure milk-seller named Narayan Kajrolkar who had defeated Dr. Ambedkar had now been replaced by V.K. Krishna Menon, the defence minister of India, and Prime Minister Nehru’s Man Friday.    

It was also the election that sealed both their fates. 

The 1962 Lok Sabha elections, largely forgotten today, was historic because of the North Bombay constituency. It was dubbed as the battle of the giants.  

The February 2, 1962 issue of Time magazine characterised it in ominous terms citing “Nehru’s aggressive socialism and left-leaning neutralism” and issued grave warnings against his “appeasement” of China, and told its people that “Americans have an important stake in this outsize election.” Above all, its cover page featured an unflattering caricature of Krishna Menon “flanked by a hooded cobra and a snake-charmer's flute.”  [Public Affairs journal: Vol. 36, No. 2]. 

BACK HOME, The Sunday Standard, Times of India, and Indian Express had sounded similar warnings as early as October 1961 almost immediately after the poll announcement had been made. 

The Indian Express, especially, invested all its resources in a singleminded quest to defeat Krishna Menon. Its formidable proprietor, Ramnath Goenka gave carte blanche to his editor, Frank Moraes to go after both Menon and Nehru. In a taunting editorial (October 18, 1961) headlined Trojan Horse, Moraes unambiguously declared that “both India and the Congress party stand at the cross-roads and the outcome will forcefully indicate which way the country and the party are to go." To spell it out, Krishna Menon was the Trojan Horse of Communist China, which had already gobbled up Tibet two years ago but Nehru had remained obstinately blind.

Unlike Dr. Ambedkar, Acharya Kriplani was armed with an entirely different set of credentials. An year elder to Nehru, he was widely respected as an elder statesman, a term that carried huge weight in that era. He was one of the closest associates of Gandhi and had occupied all top posts in the Congress before and after independence. His frugal habits and unsullied reputation commanded fear and respect from weaker Congressmen who were now in powerful positions. Nehru had no such qualms. In 1951, Acharya Kriplani met the same fate as others in the Congress who had dared to disagree with Nehru. He quit the party then and now, contested as an independent.  

Kripalani also drew the unstinted support of all anti-Congress parties and various pressure groups which backed him vigorously. Here is a short list of his supporters: the Jana Sangh, the Swatantra Party, and the Praja Socialist Party, the Muslim League, the Catholic Association, the DMK, the Republican Party, the  Peasants' and Workers' Party, and the Akali Dal. The Muslim League, which was slowly rehabilitating itself, instructed its 80,000-strong vote bank to vote for Kriplani. 

A frail and emaciated Acharya Kriplani who was pushing 75, campaigned energetically beginning in October 1961. He personally directed the whole campaign and gave broad outlines of strategy. Like a man possessed, he addressed ten public rallies each day, did door-to-door canvassing and also maintained an open door policy. He ensured that he was always available to the prospective voters of North Bombay and did not rest till voting day. 

But the biggest headache for Krishna Menon and Nehru came not from Kriplani and his formidable, unlikely coalition, but from within.  

In the 1957 elections, the rank and file of the Congress had grudgingly worked for Krishna Menon’s victory despite their misgivings about his extreme Left ideology. And when Nehru had once again bulldozed Menon’s candidature, the protests had grown louder. Maharashtra Congress strongmen like S.K. Patil and Morarji Desai had openly declared their disgust towards Krishna Menon. They correctly claimed that due to his “pro-Communism, the future of the country is not safe.” Nehru as usual, paid scant heed but got a rude wake-up call when 25 members of the Bombay Pradesh Youth Congress quit the party and joined Kriplani’s side. 

An enraged Nehru flew down to Bombay. In a vituperative public address delivered at Shivaji Park, he explicitly mentioned the 25 members and asked them to “go to hell.” And regretted it when the papers carried the news and wrote fiery editorials.  

His speeches and conduct throughout this campaign revealed for the first time the extent to which he could and did stoop not just to protect his protege but his personal prestige. It was also the first campaign in which he set the precedent for the debasement of electoral campaigning and public discourse. 

KRIPLANI’S WHOLE CAMPAIGN was hinged on Krishna Menon’s intimacy with the Communists, which implied that he was an agent of Maoist China and therefore a threat to India’s security. His ubiquitous slogan printed on posters in capitalised bold typeface was unambiguous: “MENON REPRESENTS CHINA-NOT INDIA." Two other former Congress giants added firepower to Kriplani’s unrelenting barrage: C. Rajagopalachari and Jayaprakash Narayan. 

A day before voting, Rajaji made a public appeal: “Much has been said and argued about Sri V. K. K. Menon’s candidature in North Bombay. I once again appeal to all patriotic men and women not be led away…by…irrelevant considerations… there is enough [grounds] to justify preventive action in the interest of national security and refuse to vote for Sri Krishna Menon."

But earlier in the campaign, Jayaprakash Narayan had been even more vitriolic.  This is what he had thundered in a public meeting on February 12, 1962: 

A spate of such attacks unnerved Nehru. He began spending more and more time in North Bombay, marshalling every support he could get. Three of his chief support bases included the full apparatus of the (undivided) Communist Party of India, Bollywood, and Blitz, a third-rated, lurid tabloid which acted as the Congress party’s fifth column.

For a measure of how the CPI had literally usurped the Congress’ North Bombay campaign, here is an excerpt from an “open letter” written by some Congress workers addressed to S. K. Patil, B. M. Yagnik (President of the Bombay Pradesh Congress Committee) and Chief Minister Y. B. Chavan: "Lately, to our great disappointment and consternation we find that especially in North Bombay, communists and fellow-travelers have not only captured the election machinery of the Congress but even the Congress offices.” As a consequence, substantial numbers of Congress members openly worked to defeat Krishna Menon. 

On the part of Bollywood, we can sample an excerpt from an “open letter” from “prominent film folk,” published in Blitz. It was addressed to “Fellow-citizens and friends,” and declared that “the attacks on Krishna Menon, from various quarters, are only a cover to attack our beloved Prime Minister, to weaken and undermine his basic national policies and to overthrow his inspiring leadership.” It was signed by Raj Kapoor, Dilip Kumar, ehboob Khan, Bimal Roy, Dev Anand, Rajendra Kumar, Khwaja Ahmed Abbas, B. R. Chopra, and Balraj Sahni (Blitz, Feb. 24, 1962). 

Jayaprakash Narayan hit back with equal fury, aimed directly at Nehru:

J.P was truly prophetic. 

Unable to counter Kriplani and J.P’s charges, Nehru indulged in open intimdiation akin to a street bully. He especially warned Jayaprakash Narayan, “…I do not know where he stands . . . I think he should decide whether he is on [my] side or the other side, in politics or out of it.” 

Nehru also warned the “hidden hand of the CIA.” 

He warned the “rich people of Bombay…who own big newspapers...the Jute Press, and the Press pindaris” who backed Kriplani. This was a clear reference to the owners of the Indian Express and Times of India. The Deputy Home Minister of India, Violet Alva (Margaret Alva’s mother-in-law) had reportedly called for the burning of the Indian Express building in Bombay.  

SIXTY PERCENT of the 750,000 voters of North Bombay voted. V.K. Krishna Menon won by a landslide, netting double the votes cast in favour of Kriplani. A brilliant academic analysis of this election by Norman D. Palmer (Pacific Affairs, Vol. 36, No. 2, Summer 1963) delves deep into the causes of Menon’s victory and concludes that the victory really belonged to Nehru. 

But the crux of the election was the manner in which Kriplani’s team had run the campaign. It had psychologically scared Prime Minister Nehru to the extent of making him indulge in heinous and unscrupulous practices. Indeed, Rajaji had grasped this part of Nehru’s psyche when he declared in a speech: “Whether we win or not, making the attempt to really oppose is worthwhile.”  

The Time magazine’s commentary in its March 9, 1962 edition is telling:

In the final reckoning, Menon’s electoral victory, as Kriplani had forecast, was the military defeat of India. Later in the same year. At the hands of China.